The outcome of critical incidents in the operating theatre has been shown to be influenced by the behaviour of anaesthetic technicians (ATs) assisting anaesthetists, but the specific non-technical skills involved have not been described. We performed a review of critical incidents (n=1433) reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring System between 2002 and 2008 to identify which non-technical skills were used by ATs. The reports were assessed if they mentioned anaesthetic assistance or had the boxes ticked to identify "inadequate assistance" or "absent supervision or assistance". A total of 90 critical incidents involving ATs were retrieved, 69 of which described their use of non-technical skills. In 20 reports, the ATs ameliorated the critical incident, whilst in 46 they exacerbated the critical incident, and three cases had both positive and negative nontechnical skills described. Situation awareness was identified in 39 reports, task management in 23, teamwork in 21 and decision-making in two, but there were no descriptions of issues related to leadership, stress or fatigue management. Situation awareness, task management and teamwork appear to be important non-technical skills for ATs in the development or management of critical incidents in the operating theatre. This analysis has been used to support the development of a non-technical skills taxonomy for anaesthetic assistants.
. A report from the Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS) demonstrated that the non-technical skills (NTS) of anaesthetic assistants could either ameliorate or exacerbate critical incidents 5 . NTS are the social, cognitive and personal resource skills that complement technical skills, such as situation awareness, decision-making, communication, teamwork and leadership 6 . Failures of NTS have been shown to play a major part in patient safety incidents in the operating theatre [7] [8] [9] . NTS can be identified by direct or indirect observation, by questioning techniques such as interviews, focus groups and surveys, or by reviews of events such as critical incident databases 6 . We have already performed an interview study to identify the NTS used in assisting the anaesthetist 10 and wanted to corroborate the NTS identified using an alternative method. The use of a critical incident database had the advantage of allowing us to review a large number of critical incidents with many different staff and therefore to identify patterns which might be missed in the smaller sample available in our interview study. We were unable to examine reports submitted to the National Reporting and Learning System in the UK due to its reorganisation 11, 12 , but we were fortunate to be given permission to study the AIMS database.
Profession-specific behavioural rating systems have been developed for anaesthetists 13 , surgeons 14 and scrub practitioners 15 in the operating theatre, but not the staff assisting the anaesthetist 16 . In order to make the behavioural rating systems as practical to use as possible and minimise the cognitive load on the rater, they should only include the minimum number of NTS categories required to score critical behaviours 17 . Behaviours that are not identified as common or critical in the task analysis to develop a behavioural rating system are therefore omitted or given a lower emphasis by being included at the level of an element rather than a category. The purpose of the study was to search the AIMS database for NTS used by anaesthetic assistants in critical incidents and to see which NTS featured most commonly, in order to contribute towards a behavioural rating system for anaesthetic assistants.
Materials and methods
Ethical review and approval for the study was obtained from the University of Aberdeen Psychology Ethics Committee (PEC 0910121751). The Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) granted us permission to use part of the AIMS database from 2002 to 2008 (when the format of the database changed, making comparison with previously published work more difficult). In order to ensure safe handling of the data, a confidentiality agreement was signed between the APSF and the researchers. The confidentiality agreement ensured any material released publicly was sufficiently de-identified to maintain the anonymity of those involved in the critical incident and those reporting. The data from the AIMS database was transferred as a password-protected spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel 2007, Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA), and was stored on the researchers' password-protected computer.
The data available for analysis were 1433 reports of critical incidents. The initial search was performed by the APSF and the search terms they used were the same as used by Kluger et al 5 as far as possible. Their paper describes the structure of the data collection form. The form had changed since their study, and it was not possible to search for "skilled assistance" in the "Factors minimizing the event" section.
The inclusion criteria used in this study by the APSF were reports where any of the following three criteria were present: a) "Inadequate assistance" had been ticked in the section labelled "Factors contributing to the event", b) the "Absent supervision or assistance" field was ticked and c) the narrative section of the database was searched for records that contained the terms "assistant" or "anaesthetic nurse" or "technician". Reports meeting these criteria (n=102) had identifying information removed and the file encrypted before sending it to the lead author for analysis.
These reports were examined and their unique AIMS database identifier cross-checked to remove duplicate reports, which had been identified by more than one search term. Reports were excluded if they described technicians other than anaesthetic technicians (ATs), such as pacemaker technicians, or assistance by staff not trained in anaesthetic assistance, such as radiology nurses. The reports were then reviewed and any duplicate reports of a critical incident identified and combined to be considered as a single report.
The coding scheme was the same as that described in the paper on teamwork skills of anaesthetic assistants in Scotland 10 . Two authors discussed two reports together for calibration prior to independently coding a further ten reports. The calibration was assessed with a kappa statistic using Arcus Quickstat (Biomedical) version 1.0 (Research Solutions, Cambridge, UK) and κ >0.60 being deemed adequate for independent coding 18 . The remaining reports were then coded by the lead author alone. The researchers examined the critical incidents for evidence of NTS performed by the ATs, whether this was described as such, or could reasonably be inferred from the description of events (Table 1) .
Results
The flow chart of analysis is shown in Figure 1 . The kappa statistic for cross-coding was 0.9 (very good κ=0.8 to 1)
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. There were 69 reports that both involved the AT and had sufficient information to identify their use of NTS. It appeared the AT ameliorated the critical incident in 20 cases and exacerbated it in 46 cases and both positive and negative NTS were described in the remaining three cases. 
Reports of critical incidents with anaesthetic assistant present (n=90) Excluded (n=21)
• No non-technical skills identi ed in report Non-technical skills described (n=69) Some reports had more than one NTS described and so the total number of phrases identified exceeded the number of reports with NTS. See Table 2 for the number of times NTS were reported.
Situation awareness has been defined as "the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future" 19 . Situation awareness was the most commonly identified NTS. Examples of the failure of situation awareness included:
• repeatedly failing to correctly label blood for cross-match for a bleeding patient, compounded by the notes for the previous patient still being in theatre and • placing empty anaesthetic vaporisers on anaesthetic machines-the fluid level was so low it was not obvious and the vaporiser was presumed to be full. Examples of positive situation awareness included: • noticing that a tooth had been dislodged and alerting the anaesthetist, • noticing that the intravenous fluids were not running and the patient had, therefore, not received suxamethonium as part of a rapid-sequence induction of anaesthesia and • noticing a sevoflurane vaporiser was not settled correctly on its mount. There were only two decision-making phrases identified in this study:
• an AT noticed that the patient had become unwell and thought there was an urgent need for oxygen, monitoring and assessment, and • an AT working out that a failure of delivery of volatile anaesthetic was due to the vaporiser not being seated correctly on its mount. Teamwork was predominantly described positively, in contrast to the overall descriptions of NTS being reported negatively. An example of this was:
• the AT who learnt from the parents that their child had choanal atresia and told the anaesthetist when he attempted to insert a nasotracheal tube.
Failures of teamwork involved breakdowns of communication, such as:
• not telling other staff about the insertion of throat packs, • not telling other staff about a femoral nerve block having been completed in a patient who later fell when mobilised and • the dislodgement of a chest drain when transferring a patient from the operating table.
Task management featured positively in: • the preoperative checking by ATs and • bringing an airway trolley closer to hand as a patient's condition deteriorated, in case it was required. The failure of preoperative checks was noted in a number of reports when monitors or anaesthetic machines stopped working as they had not been plugged in and the internal back-up battery had become discharged.
There were no descriptions of stress or fatigue management, nor were there any novel NTS that had not been previously described.
Discussion
This paper adds to the published literature describing the use of NTS by anaesthetic assistants in the perioperative period and shows that the ATs may ameliorate or exacerbate critical incidents through the presence or absence of their NTS. Situation awareness, teamwork and task management were all well described, but only two phrases were coded for decision-making and no instances of issues related to leadership, stress or fatigue management were found. The implication for the development of a potential NTS behavioural rating system would be that situation awareness, teamwork and task management all justify inclusion, but decision-making, leadership, stress and fatigue management should take a lesser role.
This study aimed to replicate the search terms of Kluger et al as closely as possible 5 , but the data collection form had been altered so the search term "skilled assistance" in the section labelled "Factors minimizing the event" was not present in the 2002 to 2008 version of the AIMS database. The number of critical incidents identified by both studies showed similar proportions so this difference may not have influenced our findings unduly.
Cooper et al showed that most critical incidents in theatre were due to human error rather than failure of equipment 7 , as does this review. This study replicates the findings of Kluger et al in their review of critical incidents reported to the AIMS database from 1988, but we looked for the NTS used by the anaesthetic assistants as our primary goal 5 . They looked at 5837 reports and found 172 available for review, with 148 cases where the anaesthetic assistant contributed to the adverse event or failed to assist, whilst in 24 cases they minimised the incident. This is roughly one critical incident minimised for every six exacerbated, compared to one incident minimised to two contributed in our review. Potential explanations might include that the threshold at . Another explanation for the difference may just be random variation.
We excluded reports that did not involve ATs. However, it was apparent that, despite the recommendations for assistance for the anaesthetist in Australia 20 , there were some reports where it appeared that anaesthesia or sedation was being provided without the anaesthetist having any dedicated or trained assistant, typically in a location remote from the operating theatre. There was also a report where the AT was inexperienced (within a month of starting) and working without direct supervision-whilst assisting at a difficult intubation of the trachea, he/she did not know what a bougie was and then placed the tracheal tube the wrong way round on top of the bougie.
The majority of the reports appear to have been written by anaesthetists, which could explain the near absence of phrases describing decision-making. Unless the AT voiced their thoughts out loud, the anaesthetist may well have not been aware of their decision-making. Leadership by anaesthetic assistants in our interview study largely featured when they were working with trainee anaesthetists 10 . Whilst some of the AIMS reports must have involved anaesthetic trainees, leadership by the ATs was not described. Doctors are expected to know what to do and it can be difficult for a trainee anaesthetist with limited experience to lose face by accepting the advice and leadership of an AT. The paucity of phrases coded for decision-making, and absence of phrases for leadership, cannot be taken as evidence that these skills are not used by anaesthetic assistants.
Scrub practitioners are another group in theatre who assist medical colleagues, at least in the UK. An interview study with scrub practitioners in Scotland reported themes of supporting medical staff with communication and teamwork, the importance of situation awareness and the lesser roles of decision-making and leadership (particularly evidenced when working with junior surgeons) 21 . This contrasts with the importance allocated to decision-making and leadership for surgeons in the Non-technical Skills for Surgeons behavioural rating system 14 and decision-making for anaesthetists in the Anaesthetists' Non-Technical Skills system 13 . Leadership was included under 'teamwork' within the Anaesthetists' NonTechnical Skills system.
In the UK, anaesthetic assistance is provided by anaesthetic nurses or operating department practitioners, while in Australia it is provided by ATs who have a technician or nursing background, yet the role is similar. We did not detect any substantial difference between the NTS described in AIMS with the findings of our previously reported interview study. The absence of significant differences in NTS between the two studies fails to provide evidence of anaesthetic assistance being markedly different in Australia and the UK. There are close historical and cultural links between Australia and the UK and so it may not be surprising that we did not find any major differences in this study. The requirements for anaesthetic assistants in Scotland 22 and operating department practitioners in the UK 23 correspond well with the requirements specified for ATs 20 . Naturally, there are weaknesses in the design of this research. The information reported to the AIMS database was often sparse, with inadequate details to allow us to come to determine the presence or absence of NTS on the part of the anaesthetic assistants. Although the AIMS reports could be submitted by any member of staff, the majority of the reports appear to be have been submitted by the anaesthetist, and therefore were reported from this perspective.
The staff who submitted reports could describe their own thoughts and behaviours, but may not have been aware of the thoughts of their colleagues unless they spoke aloud during the critical incident (particularly applying to situation awareness and decision-making). The NTS of task management and teamwork would be more likely to produce behaviours that can be recognised by the report's author, while the anaesthetic assistant's situation awareness and decision-making remains opaque. Despite this, situation awareness was described in almost as many reports as task management and teamwork combined.
A potential bias to the assessment of NTS in this paper is that the staff reporting the incident may be influenced in their judgement by the knowledge of the outcome of the incident. Anaesthetists judged the choice of anaesthetic more critically in a study when there was a bad outcome for the patient and were less critical if the same incident was described with a good outcome 24 . More of the phrases identified here were negative compared with our previous interview study, which looked at both routine and nonroutine events. The adverse outcome resulting in a critical incident report may have affected the higher rate of negative descriptions.
An evaluation of the Anaesthetists' Non-Technical Skills system was published in 2003 25 and the increasing awareness of NTS may have influenced the description of critical incidents over the period of data collection. The database available for analysis was from 2002 to 2008. Ideally, more contemporaneous data would have been examined, but the layout of the database had changed in 2008 so this was what was practical. The retrospective analysis of databases of critical incidents involves a delay from the time of the incidents to the time when they are released for analysis and the outcomes become available for dissemination. The larger the dataset sampled, the longer will be required for this number of reports to be registered with the database. The risk develops that the analysis of the critical incidents is no longer relevant if the practice of anaesthesia has changed significantly in the interim. The professions of ATs and anaesthetists are unlikely to have changed sufficiently over the period of reporting to publication of this article to negate the results of this study.
The NTS identified in this review of a critical incident database are associated with non-routine events, and it is possible that different NTS may be used in critical events from those used in routine practice. If this is the case, it may not be possible to directly compare the results of this investigation with our earlier interview study 10 . Despite this note of caution, it is notable that situation awareness featured so commonly in both studies.
The role of the AT will vary according to the hospital, surgical specialty, geographical region and the particular anaesthetist with whom they are working, but the requirements expected of assisting the anaesthetist remain in all these settings 20 . While there is a considerable degree of variability in the role of the AT in different settings, they can be considered as an entity. The pattern of NTS identified in this database review showed significant differences from that of other theatre professions and corresponded to that identified in the interview study. This makes the adoption of an existing behavioural rating system designed for another profession inappropriate for anaesthetic assistants.
Another potential confounder was the coding of the data. A phrase could describe more than one NTS, such as the recognition of a situation (situation awareness) requiring a decision and action (decision-making); the phrase was coded with what appeared to be the dominant non-technical skill in that situation. So if it appeared to be two-thirds situation awareness and one-third decision-making, the phrase would be coded as situation awareness, and it would appear decision-making was not required.
Conclusion
This study adds to the literature that shows the use of NTS by ATs in Australia. Our findings suggest that the NTS most commonly used by ATs in the development or management of critical incidents are situation awareness, teamwork and task management. Only two references were made to decisionmaking, while issues related to leadership, stress and fatigue management were not described. Our findings indicate that greater emphasis should be allocated to situation awareness, teamwork and task management, as compared to decisionmaking, leadership and stress and fatigue management, in the development of a taxonomy of NTS used by anaesthetic assistants in the perioperative period.
